This paper investigates the effect of U.S. border enforcement on the net flow of Mexican undocumented migration. It shows how this effect is theoretically ambiguous, given that increases in border controls deter prospective migrants from crossing the border illegally, but lengthen the duration of current illegal migrations. It then estimates the impact of enforcement on 1972-1993 migration net flows by merging aggregate enforcement data with micro data on potential and current illegal Mexican migrants. The econometric model accounts for the endogeneity of border controls using the Drug Enforcement Administration budget as an instrumental variable. Both the inflow and outflow of illegal Mexican migration are highly sensitive to changes in border enforcement. The estimates of the enforcement overall effect on illegal migration's net flow range across different specifications, from a decline -about 35% of the size of the effect on the inflow -to an increase. Thus, they suggest that border enforcement may not be an effective means to reduce the level of the illegal alien population in the United States.
Introduction
This paper studies how U.S. border enforcement affects the net flow of Mexican illegal immigration. It argues that tight border controls may have perverse effects on the net flow of illegal migration because they influence the behavior of both prospective and current migrants: while enforcement increases may deter prospective migrants from crossing the border illegally, the higher migration costs may increase current migrants' length of stay in the United States. This second effect is potentially important, given the large size and the high mobility of undocumented Mexican migrants. 1 If tougher border enforcement lengthens migration duration, patrol of the border might, to some extent, indirectly encourage the formation of a more permanent undocumented resident community. The fact that border enforcement affects illegal migrants' outflow, as well as inflow, may provide an additional explanation for the disproportionate resources allocated to border versus interior enforcement. If the effectiveness of border patrol is measured by its reduction in undocumented entries only, neglecting its impact on migrant outflow, the resulting estimate will overstate border enforcement's true effect on migration net flow. This may cause a larger than optimal resource allocation to border controls. Although there is awareness of these issues both at the theoretical and anecdotal level, the existing literature has focused almost entirely on border enforcement's impact on migration inflow only, not considering its effect on the outflow of illegal migrants. 1 Massey and Singer (1995) provide estimates of annual inflow and outflow of U.S.-based Mexican migrants.
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This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it shows how the impact of border patrol on migration net flow is theoretically ambiguous. To do so, it presents a simple model where agents may prefer to undertake multiple, costly migrations over a single longer one. The previous literature has explained multiple migrations as the consequence of shocks or of imperfect information. I show that if absence from home entails a positive disutility that increases more than proportionally in time spent away from home, repeated, short-term migrations may maximize inter-temporal utility even with complete information and with a fixed cost per migration. This setting enables me to endogenize migration duration.
Second, this paper provides, for the first time, direct estimates of the effect of border enforcement on the net flow of undocumented Mexican migrants. For this purpose, I merge aggregate border enforcement with individual-level data on undocumented migration from the Mexican Migration Project. Thus, I can observe how border controls affect the likelihood of both undertaking and returning from an illegal migration. The obtained estimates are consistent with the model predictions. Border enforcement has a significant deterrent effect, i.e. it reduces illegal migration inflow, discouraging prospective migrants from attempting an illegal trip to the United States. At the same time, it lengthens the U.S. permanence of current migrants.
Between 1972 and 1993, the estimated enforcement elasticity of inflows is -0.65 to -1.53 at the mean, depending on the specification and sample used, while the elasticity of outflows varies between -0.73 and -1.56. The effect of a marginal increase in enforcement on illegal migration net flow varies between 35% of its impact on the inflow to an overall increase. These empirical results confirm the model's prediction that assessing the effectiveness of border enforcement by analyzing its deterrent effect provides an overestimate of its true impact; they further suggest that border enforcement may not be an adequate policy to limit the illegal migrant net flow. The final contribution of this paper is to propose a new instrument, the Drug Enforcement Administration budget, to address the issue of the endogeneity of border controls in the econometric specification.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature. Section 3 derives testable hypotheses of the impact of border enforcement on both the inflow and outflow of undocumented migrants using a dynamic model of illegal migration with heterogenous costs. Section 4 describes the data used. Section 5 discusses how the sample design may bias the estimates of the border controls coefficient and provides estimates of the aggregate illegal migration inflow. Section 6 illustrates the empirical specification and the related estimation and identification issues. Section 7 presents the results from the econometric analysis, estimates the marginal effect of enforcement on the undocumented Mexican migrant net flow, highlighting some policy implications. Section 8 concludes. 3 
Literature review
There is a growing literature trying to understand the relationship between illegal migration and border enforcement. The main practical problem faced by this literature is the difficulty of directly measuring the stock and flow of illegal migration. 2 This literature focuses in particular on the relationship between enforcement and illegal migrant inflow. Several papers use records of aggregate apprehension of illegal border crossers to infer the effect of enforcement on the undocumented migrant inflow. Borjas et al. (1991) look at the relation between apprehensions and expenditure for border enforcement. Bean et al. (1990) assess the impact of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act. Espenshade (1994) tests the deterrent effect of the likelihood of border apprehension on the inflow of undocumented migration. Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) , estimate the elasticity of apprehensions with respect to border enforcement from a reduced-form aggregate apprehension function. Davila et al. (2001) estimate the short and long-run deterrent effect of border controls. 3 However, if one wants to estimate how border enforcement affects the stock of illegal migrants, the variable of interest is migration net flow: the effect of border controls on migration inflow is likely to differ from its impact on the net flow, if enforcement also changes illegal migrants' outflow. The fact that tighter enforcement, which causes an increase in migration costs, affects both the likelihood and the duration of an undocumented migration is illustrated in Hill (1987) . Kossoudji (1992) uses a sample of repeated illegal Mexican migrants to estimate the effect of past apprehension on current migration frequency and duration. This is the only previous empirical paper I am aware of where apprehension is related to migration duration. Unfortunately, the data set Kossoudji uses does not permit to distinguish interior from border apprehensions. 2 Warren and Passel (1987) use U.S. Census data to estimate the stock of undocumented aliens. Massey and Singer (1995) obtain estimates of individual probability of apprehension to assess the magnitude of the net flow of illegal migration.
3 However, only tentative inference can be made to estimate from apprehension data by how much border patrol reduces the illegal migration inflow: under current U.S. immigration law, the same individual may be arrested several times while trying to cross the border. If an apprehended illegal alien agrees on a voluntary departure, that person is simply transported back to the Mexican side of the border. Thus number of arrests does not clearly represent the volume of apprehended migrants. Espenshade (1995b) estimates the relationship between aggregate attempts and apprehensions using a repeated trials model of illegal migration and presents a way of obtaining estimates of the flow of undocumented aliens by observing the fraction of repeated apprehensions of the same individuals. However, collection of this piece of information has been discontinued since the late 1980s.
Furthermore, being a sample of migrants only, one cannot estimate the effect of enforcement on migration inflow (i.e. the number of individuals discouraged from attempting to migrate by the high level of border controls). This paper adds to the existing literature by providing estimates of enforcement's effect on illegal migration net flow.
Another branch of the literature questions the policy effectiveness of border enforcement on different grounds from the one made above. Advocates of interior enforcement suspect that inspections to firms in undocumented labor-intensive sectors might prove more successful in the eradication of illegal migration. Work by Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001) suggests that border enforcement may be the product of conflicting interests, as controls loosen when the demand for illegal labor is high. Davila et al. (1999) argue that the disproportionate resource allocation favoring border versus interior enforcement is consistent with agency budget-maximizing behavior, rather than with trying to minimize the stock of illegal U.S. residents.
A model of repeat migration
This section models multiple migration choices of heterogeneous agents. The model is used to understand how border policing affects the decisions of starting and returning from an illegal migration, and to derive testable hypotheses and an appropriate econometric specification. In addition, it sheds light on how the survey design may bias estimates of the parameters of interest.
While we understand why people migrate and why it may be optimal to return to the home country even with a higher foreign wage (see, for instance, Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) Three different determinants of repeated Mexican migrations over the life cycle are: 1) labor demand cyclicality, 2) target earning behavior, and 3) migration cost increasing convexly in duration of migration. The first case explains the existence of cyclical migration patterns as the consequence of seasonal changes in labor demand. One obvious example is the increased demand for agricultural workers during harvest time, or for hotel staff during peak seasons.
Target earning may arise as a consequence of failures in the financial market. Credit market imperfections prevent individuals from borrowing to undertake potentially profitable activities (e.g. purchases of land or machinery). Migration may be an alternative mean to raise the needed sum of money. The migrant would stay in the U.S. until he or she has saved the desired amount of money. The third case assumes that being away from home entails a migration cost that grows more than proportionally over time. For instance, the likelihood of a migrant losing claims on current and future ownership of family assets (such as land and properties) may increase convexly with time spent abroad. The longer the absence, the looser the tie with the family members left behind. The same idea applies to intangible costs, such as individuals being homesick. This hypothesis is consistent with the use of remittances as means to retain a tie with the household in the home country, or as a manifestation of altruism. The hypothesis that time away from home may be costly is also consistent with the observed evidence from the MMP71 data: the likelihood of returning from a migration is, ceteris paribus, higher for parents and married migrants, and increases with the number of children and hectares of land owned. 4 The current model of repeated migration is based on the latter hypothesis, which, I believe, captures some existing features of Mexican repeat migration. In any case, there exist also alternative assumptions that yield the same implications regarding the effect of border enforcement on the intensity and duration of illegal migration, such as the seasonality or the target earning cases discussed above.
I assume that migration costs are heterogeneous. This may arise because of different reasons. it is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, and additive in c, t, and across periods.
Individuals choose the optimal migration duration in both periods given the positive wage differential between U.S. and Mexican wages (w U S > w M X ), the strictly convex disutility from staying away from home (u t < 0 and u tt < 0) 5 , their appetite for consumption (u c > 0 and u cc < 0) 6 , and the fixed cost associated with the illegal migration (M C ). The latter is a positive function of border enforcement (bp), M Cbp > 0, and a negative function (M Ca < 0) of an individual-specific parameter (a ∈ (0, 1)) capturing heterogeneity in costs. The distribution of a is continuous over its support. From now on I will refer to this parameter as ability in crossing the border. I assume capital market perfection. r is the interest rate paid on savings (S) and β is the inter-temporal discount factor.
The maximization problem is:
where
The object 1{} is an indicator function that takes the value of one when the conditions in brackets occur. 7 Given the parameters of the model, different ability endowments will be associated with varying optimal migration durations, possibly including t * 1 = t * 2 = 0 or permanent migrations. In general, there are two possible impacts of an exogenous change in enforcement on migration in this model. First, the exogenous change could affect the optimal number of migrations, e.g. combining two short migrations into a single, longer one, or the reverse. Second, the change could also vary the length of each particular migration, conditional on the number of migrations. In the current analysis I consider only the latter case. I do this because 1), while it is simple, it is sufficient to show that higher enforcement reduces the level of contemporaneous immigration 8 ; 2) I want to focus on repeat migrants to show how changes in future (bp 2 ), as well as contemporaneous enforcement (bp 1 ) affect the duration of current migrations (t * 1 ). Focussing on the second case is equivalent to restricting the optimal migration durations to t * 1 ∈ [0, 1) and 5 Partial derivatives are sub-indexed with respect to the argument, hence ∂u/∂t = ut. 6 The assumptions on the utility function ensure that the agents' optimization problem has a maximum. 7 Note that in the preiod 2 consumption equation the fixed migration cost is only incurred if the individual has returned from his period 1 migration, i.e. t1 < 1. 8 This result holds also in the second case.
t * 2 ∈ [0, 1). However, I will discuss the implications of the second case at an intuitive level at the end of this section.
The first-order conditions 9 for migrants in both periods, i.e. individuals for whom t * 1 > 0 and t * 2 > 0, are:
One could easily extend this model to allow for future migration costs being a negative function of past migrations or for agents being unable to borrow. In these cases, the magnitude of the migrant flows would differ but the partial effects of enforcement on inflow and outflow would have the same sign.
Deterrent effect
Given preferences, wages, some continuous ability distribution and enforcement levels, agents with different ability levels will choose a different combination of current and future migrations.
Individuals whose ability level exceeds a certain threshold (a > a h ) will migrate in both periods.
Those with a sufficiently low ability (a < a l ) will never migrate. One can study the impact of changes in migration costs on migration inflow by observing how these ability thresholds change due to higher enforcement. Proving that a marginal increase in border controls increases the values of the existing thresholds shows that higher enforcement reduces migration inflow. 
In order to show the effect of enforcement changes on the inflow of illegal migration, I consider the case in which the values of wages and enforcement are identical in both periods and 9 The second-order condition matrix is negative semi-definite.
β(1+r) = 1. Since the two periods are identical, agents either migrate optimally in both periods or always stay in Mexico, provided that their disutility from staying abroad is sufficiently convex in relation to the migration fixed cost. 10 Hence, optimal migration duration is the same in both periods (t * 1 = t * 2 ), there is no savings, and there is a single relevant ability threshold, a T M M,HH , defined by the agent indifferent between migrating in both periods and not migrating in either. Define this agent's ability level as
In this scenario, increases in border controls induce the agent to favor the zero migration outcome. To establish this, I can compute the sign of the enforcement effect on ability threshold (a T ) from (1) using the implicit function theorem and the first order conditions. Given that bp 1 = bp 2 = bp and that wages and consumption are identical in the two periods, I obtain
In practice, the symmetry of the two periods makes the model equivalent to a static one. The above comparative static is sufficient to show that contemporaneous enforcement increases move the relevant ability threshold upwards, causing a deterrent effect on prospective illegal migrants.
While the simple case presented above is sufficient to make my point, more realistic assumptions on variation in costs and benefit of migration and in inter-temporal preferences will result in agents with varying ability endowments being indifferent between alternative options.
One case worth mentioning is when variations in enforcement over time cause changes in migration timing: for example, the higher future costs of migration will result in migrations being undertaken in period one rather than in period two. Consider the individual whose utility is maximized by migrating once, irrespective of when the migration occurs. This individual will be induced to migrate in the first period by a marginal increase in future migration costs. The reverse is true in case of an increase in current enforcement levels.
Optimal migration duration
After having shown how enforcement affects the inflow of illegal migration, I now proceed to show its impact on the outflow. I do this by moving back to the more general model and by considering how higher current end future enforcement levels increase the optimal migration duration in period 1 (t * 1 ) of individuals who migrate in both periods. 11 I examine this effect using comparative statics:
where ∆ indicates the wage differential. 12 These comparative statics show that the optimal migration length is a positive function of both current and future levels of border enforcement.
These results are intuitive: because of the concavity of the utility function, higher costs of migrating lengthen the time one must spend abroad to reap positive returns from the migration.
One would obtain the same result by replacing the assumption of concave utility with target earning behavior: as migration costs increase, it takes longer to save the desired amount of money.
Migration duration is also a positive function of future migration costs: for individuals who migrate in both periods, a marginal increase in future enforcement levels will increase optimal current migration duration. Illegal agricultural workers, who, with low enforcement levels, would undertake two short trips in each period during harvest season, may be induced to stay in the U.S. also between seasons because the cost of future migration has risen. In practice, given the large stock of highly mobile undocumented resident U.S. migrants, both these effects may be substantial in size.
To summarize, modeling the effect of border enforcement on choice and duration of repeated temporary undocumented migrations shows that border controls have a deterrent effect on prospective migrants: higher enforcement levels raise migration costs, causing fewer people to migrate. However, tighter enforcement affects also the behavior of current migrants, who will stay for longer time in the destination country. An increase in contemporaneous costs requires migrants to stay longer before they can benefit from the investment. Higher future enforcement also induces current migrants to delay their return because future trips are more costly. These results imply that the effect of an increase in border policing on the net flow of illegal migration is ambiguous and depends on the amount of both prospective and current migrants and on how sensitive both groups are to changes in migration costs.
These findings have several other implications: first, policy-induced changes in illegal migration inflow differ from changes in its stock, because the policy has also a significant effect on 11 Changes in future migration costs do not affect the current migration duration of individuals who migrate only in period 1. 12 This assumes that wage differentials are identical in the two periods. This simplifies the notation without changing the signs of the partial derivatives.
migration outflow. Second, the estimated effect of the policy observing only migration inflow is larger than the true one (in absolute value). Hence, judging the effectiveness of border enforcement only by assessing its impact on the inflow results in an overestimate of the true effect.
This may result in too much spending being devoted to border enforcement and too little to alternative policies, thus providing an additional explanation for the observed disproportionate resource allocation in favor of border (as opposed to interior) enforcement. Lastly, for each level of prospective migrants, the optimal level of border enforcement is a function of the stock of current U.S.-based illegal migrants.
As I argue later in the paper, the may result from using its estimated impact in the migration inflow reduction as a proxy for its effect on migrant stock. If the effect on the inflow is an overestimate of the impact on the stock (which is the case if illegal migrants lengthen their permanence in the U.S. in response to higher border enforcement) then border enforcement may appear more effective than it actually is, and attract larger funding. Table 1 . 13 Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999b) describe both the enforcement and the macroeconomic data in great detail.
The data

Individual migration information comes from the Mexican Migration Project database (MMP71).
The MMP71 sample contains data from 71 communities in 13 different Mexican states between 1987 and 1998. 14 Every year a number of different Mexican communities (normally 5) are selected in such a way as to represent a range of diverse characteristics (size, ethnic composition, location and economy). 15 Interviewers collect data on a random sample of 200 households from each locality between December and January, months in which migrants tend to return home. I
13 With the exception of the devaluation rate, which is from aggregate MMP71 data. 14 I also include data on a small sample of pilot interviews from 1982. 15 Each year, a series of U.S.-based non-random follow-up interviews are undertaken in the summer months, using snowball sampling (a method whereby interview subjects are indicated by previous interviewees). I discard this much smaller group from the analysis because it is selected through a non-probabilistic sampling methodology, although Massey and Zenteno (1999) analyze the quality of the data, and conclude that they are generally a representative source of information on Mexico-U.S. migration. observe the complete migration history of household heads. to legalize a large group of current illegal U.S. residents. 17 The implementation of IRCA was partly a reaction to the increased migration incentives caused by the economic and financial crisis that hit Mexico in the early 1980s. With high inflation levels eroding the purchasing power of wages 18 and periodic peso devaluations, more individuals were attempting to work illegally in the United States. The two panels in Figure 2 show how the relative peso value of Mexican versus U.S. wages declined dramatically during this period. This substantial time variation is useful to identify wage effects on migration.
The impact of the Mexican economic crisis on incentives to migrate is also noticeable in 16 By linewatch hour I mean one hour of patrolling duty along the southwestern U.S. border. 17 Border Patrol budget, which has been increasing continuously since 1986, does not reflect the 1988 sharp linewatch hours decrease. Inspection of the monthly linewatch data shows that the lower enforcement in 1988 is concentrated in the month of August. The enforcement intensity of the remaining 11 months is closer to 1987 and 1989 levels. Unfortunately, migration data are at the annual level only. 18 Mexican real minimum wage decreases by 74% in the first half of the 1980s (Hanson and Spilimbergo, 1999) . 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 .021
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.66 There is a 12-month window to apply for the legalization and it takes several months for the authorization migrations. Average returns are now proportionally higher than pre-IRCA ones, although one may attribute it to the change in illegal migrant mix: longer-term undocumented migrants are now legal (eligible applicants must prove they had been living in the United States since 1982), and this leaves a larger proportion of short-term migrants.
There are various wage measures that might affect migration decisions. I observe both minimum wages and some measures of private sector wages. In particular, I have data on U.S.
average hourly minimum wage and Mexican monthly average minimum wage; and on U.S. hourly private sector wages and on an index of Mexican average production manufacturing hourly wage.
The advantage of conditioning on minimum wages is that they may provide an upper bound to the wage paid to unskilled, illegal migrants. 21 Private sector wages, instead, have more time variation and are likely to be more responsive to changes in labor supply and demand. I chose to condition on private sector wages for these reasons, and also because minimum wages appear to be highly multicollinear with the other explanatory variables in the regressions. 22 In any case, the trends of minimum and private wages are not too dissimilar.
Survey design and data issues
Four characteristics of the survey design may cause a bias in the estimated effect of enforcement on illegal migration net flow. The first two are different types of non-random sample selection:
the absence of some current migrants due to data being collected in Mexico only, and the fact that the sampled communities may not be representative. The remaining two are the recall bias associated with the use of retrospective data, and the use of an unbalanced panel to identify the effect of longitudinal variation in enforcement. 23 The most important source of potential bias is caused by data being collected in Mexico.
Although I observe household heads' migration history even if the person is absent at the time of the interview, no information is available when the whole family is away. Some of the household heads missing from the data are illegal migrants in the United States whose family joined them.
to be granted. 21 Illegal migrants are mainly unskilled individuals: average education level for the population of potential migrants is 5.1 years, whereas Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999b) report that mean school years for individuals employed in manufacturing in Mexico was 8.1 in 1990. 22 The analysis of the correlations between both sets of wages and the other variables used in the econometric model show that the multicollinearity arising from the use of minimum wages cannot be directly related to any pairwise correlation. 23 Munshi (2003) has a very good discussion of potential data issues caused by the MMP survey design, applied to a different context. Some estimation issues are common to both exercises. I refer the interested reader to this additional source.
This is likely to bias estimates of the effect of border enforcement on illegal migration inflow and outflow, albeit to different extents. Missing data are more problematic for the effect of enforcement on illegal migration outflow.
The missing household heads are a larger fraction of the sample of current illegal migrants.
Moreover, if unobserved heads are long-term illegal migrants, they may be the least sensitive to enforcement changes. Hence, the estimated effect of enforcement on the likelihood of returning from illegal trips may be larger (in absolute value) than the true one.
A second characteristic of the data that may cause selection problems is the non-randomness to an average annual increase of 90,000. Using the method described above, I calculate that the average annual growth in the illegal population stock using MMP71 data for the same years is 87,000.
To summarize, the evidence provided so far is by no means a proof of the absence of sample selection, but it supports the view that it may be small or negligible, especially concerning illegal migrant inflow. There may be an upward bias in the estimates of the effect of enforcement on migrant outflow. Therefore, one can interpret the estimated effects of border controls on illegal migrant outflow as upper bounds (in absolute value) of the true parameters.
An additional estimation issue may be generated by the retrospective nature of the data.
The presence of recall bias in the dependent variable will not bias the estimates of the effect of enforcement on migration inflow and outflow, unless the errors are systematic and vary over time Separately estimating the enforcement effect on inflow and outflow is more useful, from a policy perspective, than looking at the effect of border policing on the net flow directly. For instance, suppose the enforcement effect on the net flow of illegal migration is zero. Policy implications could still depend on how much inflow and outflow are sensitive to increases in the enforcement level. In case they both are, enforcement "works" and one may want to increase enforcement and provide further incentives for illegal migrants to leave the United States. If both flows are not affected by enforcement changes, border policing "does not work"; the policy maker would have to look for different policies to stem illegal migration. 25 I also estimate the effect of enforcement using time-series data, where possible. This is explained in further detail below. 26 There are roughly 10,000 potential migrants, corresponding to about 135,000 person-year units in the sample.
About 85% of the sampled individuals never migrates in the observed years. The average number of migrations for those who migrate is 2.49, while the maximum number of observed illegal trips for the same individual is 22.
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Estimating the likelihood of migrating illegally
The previous section has shown that migration decisions depend on economic differentials between Mexico and the United States and on the level of border enforcement. I use a linear probability model to specify the likelihood that a potential illegal migrant undertakes a migration at time t, as a function of the variables affecting the costs and benefits of migration considered in the theoretical model:
where m is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one when an individual leaves Mexico to undertake an illegal migration, bp is border enforcement and X contains macroeconomic variables that influence the migration decision and are potentially correlated with border controls. These where µ m i and λ m t represent all individual-and time-specific factors that influence the migration decision and are not captured in the theoretical model, while ε m it is some white-noise disturbance. The parameter of interest is β m . 27 Border controls may be endogenous, as the enforcement level may be correlated to unobservable shocks to migration. For instance, a lack of political stability in Mexico may provide additional incentives to migrate to the United States. Border enforcement may be tightened 27 Migration is likely not to be a static decision: decisions may depend on both the current environment and on expectations of the future environment. While the econometric specification in (4) 
considering a linear probability model for simplicity. One expects the first term
to be negative, and the following ones,
, positive, with a negative net effect. In a previous version of the paper I estimated also a model where current migration decisions are affected by future as well as current levels of enforcement and macroeconomic variables. The estimated coefficients are consistent with the above discussion:
higher current enforcement reduces the likelihood of undertaking a contemporaneous migration by decreasing its costs. However, agents anticipate future enforcement to be higher too. This effect increases the likelihood of a current migration by a smaller magnitude than the direct effect on current costs. These results are not presented here, but are available upon request.
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having illegal border crossers carry drugs, but that the phenomenon is quite recent. In the time period covered by my data, migrant smugglers are primarily former migrants and do not belong to sophisticated organizations.
I have also tried alternative instruments. I considered dummies to control for the political party of the current U.S. president, and a variable that indicates whether both Senate majority and U.S. president are Republican. The significance of these latter variables suggests that border enforcement resource allocation may be influenced by the political cycle. 28 However, it is possible that the former variables directly affect migrants' propensity to move to the United States. I also considered the number of years to a presidential and congressional election as additional instruments, but the significance of these additional regressors is not very high in the first-stage regression. 29 Given the fact the the validity of these further instruments is questionable, and that the IV estimates of the parameter of interest are not affected by their exclusion from the first-stage equation (once I condition on DEA budget), the result section reports only output obtained using DEA budget as instrumental variable. between the annual mean of µ m i and bp t . However, if the bulk of Mexican illegal migration is constituted by temporary moves, with individuals migrating on their own, and leaving their 28 There is a significant higher enforcement level when both majority senate and president are Republican.
Moreover, patrol of the border is lower in presidential election years, when the outgoing president is Republican. 29 When I use monthly levels of border enforcement rather than annual one, the significance level of month-toelection variables is much higher. Unfortunately, monthly migration data is not available.
family behind, one expects the magnitude of the bias to be small, if not negligible.
Further estimation issues are, first, that shocks to migration may be serially correlated, as already noted by Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) . Shocks may be persistent, they may reach the farthest regions with a lag, or individual reaction to them may be delayed. I control for serial correlation by modeling the error term as generated by an AR (1) 
Estimating the likelihood of returning from an illegal migration
The theoretical model predicts that optimal migration duration is a function of enforcement levels and of economic differentials. I express the relationship between migration costs and duration in terms of the individual likelihood of returning home. Hence, if migrations are lengthened by higher costs, I expect the return probability to be a negative function of the latter.
For individual i in time period t, the probability of returning from an illegal U.S. trip conditional on being an undocumented U.S. resident is described by the following linear probability
The dependent variable, r it is zero for current illegal migrants who do not return home, and one for those who leave to Mexico in time t. β r measures the marginal effect of enforcement on the likelihood of returning from an illegal U.S. trip. 31 The set of X variables is the same as used in 30 I also estimated a probit model, relaxing the assumption that the conditional probability is linear in the parameters. I addressed the endogeneity issue in a non-linear framework by adopting Smith's (1986, 1989 ) control function approach, computing block-bootstrap estimates of the coefficient standard errors of both border controls and residuals from the first-stage regressions. I did not present these results because the estimated probit standard errors are biased in the presence of heteroskedasticity. However, the LPM and probit point estimates are remarkably similar in magnitude. 31 Again, the parameter of interest can be interpreted as the sum of the direct and indirect effect of changes in border enforcement on the likelihood of returning to Mexico. Both effects are expected to be negative, as 24 the migration likelihood equation.
As before, the error term can be decomposed into an individual-specific effect, µ r i , a timevarying effect, λ r t , and a white-noise disturbance, ε r it :
There are now two main sources of potential endogeneity. One is the possibility that the level of enforcement may be responsive to shocks to outflow λ r t . As in the previous case, I address this issue by using DEA budget as an instrumental variable. The other one is due to sample selection. The decision to migrate depends on the intensity of border controls. Higher migration costs select migrants with "better" observable and unobservable characteristics (in the sense that their migration is profitable despite the higher costs). Hence, the unobserved characteristics of incoming migrants are likely to be positively correlated with enforcement. This is a cohort effect.
I believe I cannot deal with this additional source of endogeneity using an instrumental variable approach. While in the case of endogeneity due to unobserved shocks to migration it is possible to think of separating the part of the enforcement variation that does not depend on aggregate shocks, in the selection case any variation in enforcement causes a change in the composition of migrants. Alternatively, one could try and find exclusion restrictions that affect the likelihood of migrating but not that of returning from a migration. These restrictions are hard to find. Hence, I propose a different identification approach. I add a set of cohort I estimate (5) by LPM using DEA budget as instrumental variable to account for the correlation between bp and λ r t . Again, I cluster the standard errors at the year level, and interpret the estimated coefficients as local linear marginal effects at the mean of the explanatory variables. Table 2 reports OLS and IV estimates of the marginal effect of border enforcement on the likelihood of undertaking an undocumented migration. Even-numbered columns provide instruconfirmed by a set of estimations not reported here but available upon request. 32 The base category is 1972 and earlier. Table 2 . I did not produce a table of the results because that the probit standard errors (estimated by block-bootstrap, where the block is the year) are biased because they do not account for the serial correlation in the residuals. Looking at the other variables, higher returns from migration increase the incentives to leave Mexico, as shown by the negative effect on US unemployment and the positive effect of US wages (in pesos) on the likelihood of undertaking an illegal trip. Surprisingly, a higher Mexican wage index significantly increases the likelihood of becoming an illegal migrant. This result may suggest that during economic recessions it becomes harder to finance a trip, which may be quite costly for some potential migrants. Finally, higher legalizations are associated with a lower illegal migration likelihood, as the status of some migrants is changing from undocumented to legal. Table 3 35 Results not shown but available upon request. : the values of the cohort dummy coefficients are significantly higher for more recent cohorts. Standard errors clustered at the year level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Border control levels measured in million linewatch hours. The first-stage equation includes all the explanatory variables in the main regression, as well as the DEA budget.
Results
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If there are common shocks to illegal migration inflow and outflow, this evidence is consistent with the idea that positive shocks to immigration, which induce the policy maker to increase border controls, also increase the current migrants' likelihood of returning to Mexico. For instance, consider the case of a currency devaluation in Mexico: this may provide additional incentives to become an illegal migrant, as the peso value of US salaries increases, but it also increases the peso purchasing power of savings (in dollars) of current undocumented migrants, inducing them to leave earlier. Thus, the shock may increase both the inflow and the outflow of undocumented Mexican migrants to the United States, as well as an endogenous tightening of border controls.
The estimated enforcement coefficient from column 8 implies that a one unit increase in border controls decreases the individual likelihood of leaving the United States by 31.8 percentage points. Since each year 46% of the population of U.S. resident illegal migrants leave the country to return to Mexico, such one-unit enforcement increase would decrease average returns by 69%.
The associated enforcement elasticity is -1.56, negative and smaller than -1, implying that a marginal increase in linewatch hours is associated with a more than proportional reduction in returns from illegal trips. Hence, it appears that current migrants' return decision are extremely sensitive to changes in migration costs. However, recall that the estimated partial effects may be upper bounds of the true effects: if some long-term illegal migrants are missing, the sampled individuals may be more sensitive to enforcement changes than the population of undocumented Mexican migrants.
Robustness checks
I test whether the results are sensitive to the chosen specification by slightly changing the set of conditioning variables: I replace the peso value of US wages by its dollar value, and add a variable measuring the intensity of Mexican currency devaluations. In this way, one can better understand how changes in push and pull factors affect the migration and return likelihoods.
The sign, significance and magnitude of the enforcement partial effect do not change, as shown in Tables 4 and 5 . However, the values of the Hausman test are generally lower. Now US wages increase the likelihood of both becoming an undocumented migrant and returning from an illegal trip (although in this latter case the coefficient is seldom statistically significant).
Peso devaluations increase the likelihood of leaving Mexico and decrease the one of leaving the United States. Now the Mexican wage index no longer increases the likelihood of migrating illegally, while it increases the probability of returning from an undocumented trip. The effect of legalization is unchanged. Standard errors clustered at the year level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Border control levels measured in million linewatch hours. The first-stage equation includes all the explanatory variables in the main regression, as well as the DEA budget. 
Interpretation and policy implications
The values of the parameters of interest for the transitions from potential to current migrant status and vice versa cannot be directly compared, because they refer to two different populations (the set of all potential illegal migrants, in the first case, and the sub-set of actual migrants, in the second). I obtain an estimate of the marginal effect of border enforcement on the net flow of Mexican illegal migration in the following way. I compute the partial effect of a marginal increase in enforcement on both the inflow (Ī) and the outflow (Ō) of migration at mean values: Tables 2 and 4, columns 2, 4 and 6, and the partial effects on return from a migration from Tables 3 and 5 , columns 4, 6 and 8. I consider alternatively the impact of hiring an additional patrolling agent and the effect of the average annual linewatch increase, which amounts to 77,500 hours. 36 These results are presented in Table 6 . 36 In this latter case I assume that the partial effect of enforcement is linear for a sufficiently large interval around the mean. Column (3) is the difference between columns (1) and (2) . Columns a use the whole sample; columns b restrict the valid cases to maximum 15 years recall period; columns 3 use the same data from columns b but re-weight the observation to give each year the same weight.
It is worth stressing the multiple conclusions from the above exercise. First, gross un- Second, border patrol's deterrent effect on prospective undocumented migration is sizeable.
Given the estimated values, and assuming linearity for a sufficiently large interval around the mean marginal effect, the average annual increase in border enforcement of 77,500 linewatch hours discourages approximately 30,000 to 63,000 individuals from crossing the border illegally (770 to 1,620 for one additional patrolling agent). However, current undocumented migrants' lower mobility largely offsets the deterrent effect: the average annual enforcement increase prevents some 32,000 to 76,000 illegal resident aliens from returning home (830 to 1,960 with one additional patrolling agent), since the tougher controls raise migration costs, and lengthen migrants' stay in the host country. The effect of border controls on returns from illegal trips may be overstated, since the available data may not include some permanent undocumented migrants.
In any case, these results are interesting because they show how enforcement's effect on the level of illegal migration is only a small fraction of its impact on the undocumented inflow. Indeed, the estimates of the effect of border controls on migrant net flow are in some cases positive. This suggests that border enforcement may not be effective in reducing the level of illegal migration in the United States, or that it may do so at a very high cost, according to which sets of estimates one considers. Looking at the top right panel in Table 6 , and assuming a gross cost of $50,000
for the employment of an extra patrolling agent, the associated net flow reduction of 208 to 503 migrants implies a marginal cost of 240 to 100 dollars per migrant. 37 38 The cost is even higher if one considers that on average only 59 percent of work time is spent patrolling the border (GAO, 1996) .
The outcome of this analysis raises interesting policy issues. Border controls do not seem to contribute to a sizeable reduction in the level of illegal resident aliens in the United States.
Moreover, tight border enforcement seems to involuntarily create a more permanent population of illegal resident aliens. A more stable group of illegal migrants may have worse long-term effects on the stock of undocumented migration than a highly mobile one: the establishment of U.S.-based illegal migrant enclaves may decrease migration costs for prospective migrants (short-term migrants may lack both possibility and interest in helping others out). Moreover, participation in welfare programs might be a positive function of time spent in the United States.
This additional indirect cost should be considered in any welfare analysis of the impact of border enforcement policies.
Conclusions
This paper contributes to the existing literature on Mexican illegal migration to the United States and its border enforcement. It points out that border enforcement influences both the inflow and outflow of illegal migration to the United States. In fact, more stringent border controls may not only deter potential undocumented migrants from entering the United States, but also lengthen the duration of current illegal trips, since they raise the cost of contemporaneous (and possibly future) migration. The resulting effect on illegal migration net flow is unclear.
Subsequently, inferring the impact of the policy by observing how the inflow of undocumented migrants changes in response to tighter enforcement may be misleading.
The existing literature has not sufficiently acknowledged the need to look at both inflow and outflow of migrants, partly because of the scarce availability of direct information on undocumented migration. I overcome this difficulty by merging unpublished INS data on enforcement intensity along the Mexico-U.S. border with individual illegal migration information from the 37 The cost would be infinite if one considered the positive estimates of the enforcement effect on the net flow. 38 This computation ignores the additional benefits of the patrolling agent, such as apprehending drug smugglers. resident population -hence probably more costly in terms of welfare participation.
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